It’s nothing new that the music industry is experiencing a steady downward trend in album sales. A few years ago, chart toppers were moving millions of albums a week. This trend isn’t just continuing, it’s advancing. For the first quarter of 2008, albums sales were down 10.7% from the same period last year, according to SoundScan figures.

As if that isn’t enough, last week’s sales showed an almost 25% drop from last year, and the number one album sold 166,000 copies. This is a very impressive figure for a mid level label, and indie labels would breaking out the champagne, but for transnational companies whose yearly sales are in the billions, these figures point a major crisis. The boat isn’t just taking on water anymore, it’s halfway under the waves.

It’s important to note that this measures only physical sales, and beyond that, only albums registered with SoundScan. While physical sales are traditionally the most lucrative part of the music business, digital sales are where the action – and the money – is at now.

People are still buying music, and billions of dollars worth of it. What’s shifted is the variety that is being bought is expanding at an exponential rate – an alarming development for the companies who invest millions into a single artist. The market isn’t so much evolving anymore, it’s already evolved. The focus around 360 deals is a perfect example of the shift the flow of money around music.

With the the combination of iTunes, Amazon, eMusic, and the army of other digital music sites that now dominate the market, the entry of Wal-Mart, Target and other major retailers into full scale album sales, and the diversity of music offered to people through social networking and file sharing, the business of selling music isn’t the same business it was five years ago; in many ways it isn’t the same business it was two years ago.

The issue at hand isn’t so much the collapse of physical sales as it is the diversifying of people’s tastes. Music is so easy to create and distribute now that the choices are nearly limitless. Anyone with a few ideas and a computer can have an album out on the web for sale, and even produce physical copies cheaply.

So how low can album sales go?

In my opinion, we’re nearing the bottom of the spiral. Physical sales may shrink a bit more, it seems that at this point the only people buying physcail albums are the ones who want the album, and fans can always be counted on to support artists.

I’m not a soothsayer, but I predict that 2008 is the year we see a major shift in the way major labels conduct business, adopting more elements of the DIY and underground communities in signing, developing and marketing artist.

Bottom Line: Sales figures measure something in reality. In reality, the music business is a brand new entity. Welcome to the Age of Variety.

“When the history of our digital times comes to be written, one of the questions that will puzzle historians is why the record companies missed the significance of the internet.”

What a great thought (and a very catchy headline). Here is a summary of the article, with some commentary.

Since World War II, the record industry had a total monopoly on the recording, packaging, and distribution of music. They controlled the careers or artists, the way the music was disseminated, and dictated terms to music retailers. When the CD came around in the early 1980′s, and as the article says “recording studios converted the sounds made by musicians into bitstreams – long sequences of ones and zeroes – while, at the consumer end, CD players converted those bits back into high-fidelity sound.”

The sales model for this era was to create the plastic disks and packaging, ship them distribution houses, and then off to retailers. While this model proved to be profitable, the overhead costs were astronomical, with up to 50% of the retail price of a CD eaten up by production costs.

The internet was poised to change all of this for major labels. It presented the opportunity to drop production costs to the floor, while expanding profits. But the internet was ignored at first, and then it was treated as a realm for legal prosecution. Even bands chimed in, complaining about the evils of the internet. This practice got so widespread that the RIAA began prosecuting teenagers and single moms. And as the industry resisted the internet, CD sales bottomed out.

To put it simply, the major labels did not want to let go of CDs in the face of an evolving marketplace. Rather than adapt to the climate, they attempted to maintain the status quo. The writer of the article states “The obvious hypothesis – that the senior executives of all the record companies were idiots – has always seemed implausible to me. Or it did until I read the recent interview in Wired magazine with Doug Morris, chairman and CEO of Universal Music Group.”

Because CDs were so profitable, the music industry turned a blind eye to what was next, and settled into a short sighted approoch rather than looking at the big picture.

Bottom Line: The record industry can turn itself around virtually overnight by embracing and adapting to technology. Welcome to the Future.

An interview with the Flashbulb about his recent calamity with iTunes, and putting his album up on BitTorrent. It turns out iTunes is selling his albums without permission, and not paying royalties.

The Flashbulb (Benn Jordan) has been releasing albums for 14 years, the last 5 have included various commercial endeavors. The label deal he has is a 50/50 split, but he hasn’t been seeing the money. Benn says he has no agreement with iTunes to sell his music, and many of his fans have told him they bought his music there. When he investigated the issue further, his label asked him to drop it, and his calls went unreturned.

Here’s a great quote from Benn: “Who’s the pirate I should go after? A kid who downloads my album because it isn’t available in non-DRM format and costs $30 on Amazon? Or a huge multi-billion dollar corporation that has been selling thousands of dollars worth of my music and not even acknowledging it?”

Benn is being labeled in the press as pro-piracy, but his true stand is that people buy what they like. “What I’m promoting is the artist’s freedom to choose what can and can’t be done with his/her music, and more importantly, the listener’s freedom to do what he/she wants with their own computer, MP3 player, or internet connection.”

Benn makes a poignant case that the RIAA has spent so long dictating people’s taste and choices that they are now threatened by the opportunity for people to choose the music they want. He suggests that “music will be judged by it’s content again and will be subjected to it’s own Darwinism.”

Bottom Line: Where are all those billions in album sales really going?

Ghosts is a variation on a theme created by Radiohead. The latest NIN album is part free, part paid, part digital, and part traditional. And a broad range of consumer preferences and budgets are accommodated by the initiative.

Reznor and Radiohead are important market-movers and fearless risk-takers. But are these experiments really relevant to the broader music industry?

The problem is that only part of the consumer population is going to play along. Radiohead found that a disproportionate number of fans downloaded In Rainbows for free, an offered option. But an even larger number of fans downloaded the album for free outside of the Radiohead page, on BitTorrent, P2P, and other sharing protocols.

These fans wanted the album on their turf, not Radiohead’s. And that has been the bigger story for the recording industry for the past ten years. Sure, the iTunes Store has sold 4 billion downloads, but that is just a tiny fraction of the free downloads obtained from other channels.

Outlets like Limewire offer instant, on-demand bulk downloads and comprehensive recording catalogs for free. The iTunes Store offers a cleaner copy, but for a price that makes collection volume difficult to achieve.

Now, Trent Reznor is about to learn a similar lesson. Most likely, fans will grab the first, free volume of the album in heavy numbers, and a smaller percentage will pay for the expanded collection.

But that is only part of the story. Outside of that sandbox, volumes II-IV will quickly creep onto Gnutella, BitTorrent, and IM. Sure, Reznor seeded the first volume onto BitTorrent. But who are we kidding? Fans are in charge of this channel, not Reznor.

That means far lower volumes for NIN, or any other established artist, compared to the 90s. Other factors are also sapping energy, including an increasingly-fragmented media market, and the lowered attention spans that come with it.

Then again, who needs 90s volumes when the major label is suddenly optional? After all, Reznor can now keep the revenues (almost) all to himself, and achieve robust revenues on far smaller volumes.

The math is alluring, and a major disincentive for signing with a label. Marketing specialist Seth Godin urges artists to cultivate targeted, niche audiences, and any business school graduate will lecture you on the value of consumer targeting. Why not translate those principles and percentages into a healthy, more controllable career?

The question is becoming less and less academic, and artists like Trent Reznor are putting the possibilities into motion. But it remains unclear if artists can healthily sustain themselves using this philosophy, at least in scalable numbers.

And smaller artists will have difficulty applying the Radiohead model, at least until their recognition grows. Why? The reason is that most lesser-known artists have trouble getting people to download their content for free, much less pay for it. Why pay for something blind? That is a game for pre-2000 consumers.

In contrast, Reznor and Radiohead have established names, thanks to a massive, major label publicity machine. That tailwind is a critical component of the current models – and a major reason why media outlets are focusing heavily on their initiatives.

In the middle are artists like Saul Williams, a poet and rapper that exists outside of the mainstream. Reznor actually helped Williams create a Radiohead-like model with the help of Musicane, and the results were mixed. Less than 20 percent opted to pay $5 for the album – a total of nearly 28,000. Then again, that translates into roughly $142,000, a revenue total that easily pays the bills.

And any starving artist knows that six-figures is a goldmine for a life in the arts. A major would drop Williams in a heartbeat after a performance like that. But sailing solo, Williams could command a decent and consistent payout.

So is the Radiohead model relevant? For more established, post-label artists, the concept probably maximizes recording profits, and creates momentum for other revenue generators. And the results are boosted if the recordings are dispersed across a broad number of sales outlets, including the artist page, iTunes, Amazon MP3, and even traditional brick-n-mortar.

Sure, the result is smaller than 90s recording sales potentials, but it is something nonetheless. And if the consumer elects to pay, they have the opportunity to do so.
What about everyone else? For mid-size artists, the concept can translate into meaningful revenues, and for smaller artists, the idea is probably premature ahead of broader audience awareness. But more than ever, artists have the potential to reach super-targeted audiences, and that greatly increases the chances of a paid transaction.

Here’s a paper titled “Does Chatter Matter? The Impact of User-Generated Content on Music”. It’s a study in how blogs and and social networking sites are impacting music sales. The study did not include any analysis on radio or internet broadcasting as a variable. Since this a very long and convoluted paper, I’ll give you the highlights.

(a) the volume of blog posts about an album is positively correlated with future sales
(b) greater increases in an artist’s Myspace friends week over week have a weaker correlation to higher future sales
(c) traditional factors are still relevant – …a number of reviews from mainstream sources … tended to have higher future sales.

People naturally look to others for opinions. Music recommendation is part of this phenomenon. When people put time and effort into good blogs, readers find value in the content and message. With MySpace, the promotion of music in top friends can be a powerful recommendation tool. And album reviews and ratings are factors in people’s buying habits.

The study was conducted for four weeks before and after an album’s release, and the sales data was based on Amazon’s top sellers of physical units.

The study discovered that mainstream album ratings did not relate to online or consumer ratings. Blog postings had the strongest relationship to sales. Higher blog post volumes and higher percentage changes in Myspace friends corresponded to increased weekly sales in the future.

They also concluded that blog posts had a larger impact on sales than MySpace, and they hypothesized that was due to a credibility gap. MySpace allows for passive involvement, while reading blogs is a more active pursuit. Also, critical acclaim in reviews did not have the impact on sales that they expected.

Ultimately, the study was unable to determine whether or not blog chatter actually causes sales, as there were too many undetermined variables. Blog chatter does on some level represent the buzz around an album, making it an expected phenomenon that it had an impact.

Here’s a quote form the conclusion of the article:

“We analyzed the usefulness of blogs and social networks, as well as reviews in
consumer, online media, and mainstream media, in predicting album sales in the four weeks before and after the album’s release date. We found that the most significant variable is blog chatter or the volume of blog posts on an album, with higher numbers of posts corresponding to higher sales.

Higher percentage changes in Myspace friends may also be significant, although the results here were not consistent … We find that the average consumer rating is significant, while the number of consumer reviews is not … Average consumer ratings better predict[ed] sales than average mainstream media ratings.

Although we found that user-generated content is a good predictor of music album sales, our analysis showed that traditional factors cannot be ignored. While independent label releases with extremely high blog chatter can sell even more units than major label releases, our findings estimated that the average major label release sold approximately twelve times more than the average independent label release. We also found that the higher the number of mainstream media reviews, the greater the sales.”

Bottom Line: The results of this study suggest that user-generated content should be considered seriously by record labels.

Here are some of tasty quotes :

“it’s always very difficult going from something that’s free to an industry to something that has a cost to the industry.”

“I think what we have to do is far more flexible about price. The industry has been very bizarre over the years – it’s essentially a one price industry.”

“I don’t want to destroy physical sales … We find physical and digital are both viable markets that people enjoy using. But clearly, there’s an opportunity for music on tap, and as a service, and it’s something we should explore.”

“I would like to see copyright modernized in 2008, with people enabled to do what they want to do, and those who profit from it allowing the practice [third parties] to be monetized. I’d like to see barriers taken away from the enjoyment of music.”

“I think P2P does have a discovery element to it, and it you may discover something on P2P that makes you buy a product. CD burning is much more domestic piracy, and is much more somebody avoiding paying for something.”

“I think the whole “DRM as a policeman” policy was doomed to failure – the independent companies never supported it to any extent whatsoever. We have never believed in putting obstacles into what the consumer wants to do.”

“We inhabit a mature industry that’s grown on a multi-territorial basis. And, frankly ,if you were reinventing it today you’d reinvent it way differently. It would be global, not territorial.”

“…[T]he market is in the control of one or two parties, and we don’t think that’s healthy.”

“The patrons are going to be largely commercial so brands that see an advantage to a certain kind of artist, and that is putting art far to close to commerce. That would mean marginal music wouldn’t exist, you’d only have music that had a commercial upside for sponsors. That’s a world none of us really want to see.”

“Music publishers, the record labels and digital music distribution outlets began a three-way legal wrestling match Monday over just how much songwriters and the publishing houses should get paid for digitally delivered music.”

At stake in this debate is mechanical royalties for internet streams. Major labels, Apple, and Yahoo want the royalty rate for artists to be lowered. The big publishing houses are currently promised nine cents a song, a figure that often gets negotiated lower, and the consortium against them wants that rate moved to 8%. Apparently, publishing revenues are up, while major label revenues are down. The Digital Media Association is upping the ante, pushing for the royalty rate to be dropped to 4%.

On the other side of the fence, the National Music Publishers Association wants the rates raised to 12.5%.

The driving concern here is the financial ‘burden’ that paying these royalties puts on the large companies that offer music. The claim is that streaming media should be treated like terrestrial radio.

Bottom Line: Without content, there is nothing to stream.

Despite strong digital gains, recent quarterly losses at Warner Music Group are part of a continuing profit slide. But just how serious is the financial picture?

This isn’t a rosy period of double-digit gains, that’s for sure. And flagship CDs are in a free-fall. But the financial picture at Warner is showing more resilience than you might imagine under the circumstances.

Warner Music Group first went public in 2005, a period that featured far more investor optimism. But the profit picture has been slipping since, and Wall Street has been mostly unsympathetic.

What was once slightly-in-the-black has now gone red. During Warner’s calendar fourth quarter of 2004, profits landed at $36 million, only to improve to $69 million the following year. But by 2006, the holiday story started losing steam. The company earned a smaller $18 million during the period, though profits turned to losses – of $16 million – during the most recent Christmas buying quarter.

But not everything is so bleak. Major label executives often temper the picture by pointing to more stable revenues, less severe profit declines, and bullish digital gains. Of course, some of that is spin, but in the case of Warner Music, balance sheets actually support those claims.

In fact, the revenue story has not been disastrous. Revenues topped $1.088 billion during the fourth quarter of 2004, roughly 9.1 percent greater than revenues reported during the recent period. Of that total, digital assets now account for 14 percent of total revenues – up from nearly zero several years ago.

On an annual scale, a similar revenue picture emerges. Dialing back to the fiscal year ending November 30th, 2003, revenues neared $3.23 billion. Fast-forward to the fiscal year ending September 30th, 2007, and revenues of $3.39 billion appear – hardly an implosion. Not the envy of companies worldwide – after all, a flattening revenue picture is rarely good news. But not exactly a sinkhole, either.

Why the revenue resilience? Is creative accounting at work? Almost every company dances the numbers a bit, but artistic accounting has its limits – especially in the current regulatory climate.

And ugly profit losses year-after-year prove the point. Warner Music dropped $21 million during the most recent fiscal year, and actually gained $60 million during the previous year.

But the worst financial losses happened during the earlier part of the decade. In 2005, the company lost $169 million, an improvement over 2004 declines of $1.42 billion. And losses hit an immense $1.35 billion in 2003, and a disastrous $6.03 billion in 2002, in part because of accounting methodology changes.

Those are major drops, though at least the earnings picture is showing improvement. The question is whether Warner – and other majors – can survive the current turmoil, one that now includes a massive, 15 percent US-based album sales decline in 2007.

The current terrain is characterized by serious overhead cuts and slippery traditional retail declines. That is a worsening picture, though major labels like Warner carry enviable recording and publishing assets.

Perhaps the best prognostication involves a breed of smaller major labels ahead, though survival depends on a leaner, greatly diversified model. And in the case of Warner, and other labels, the financial picture is less severe than generally reported – and that spells a little more wiggle room for radical reinvention.

Here’s a great article about the new marketing methods we’ll be seeing in 2008.? We will begin to see large scale experiments in subscription based music distribution and other models which eliminate a pay by the track model (such as Imeem).? The death of DRM may come this year, as three of the Big Four labels are already in the process of abandoning it.? There are rumors of deals in the works between major labels and ISPs (internet service providers) to offer unlimited downloads or more bandwidth, and we can expect to see multiple collectible versions of albums released.

As the shift in music sales hits overdrive into the digital realm, 2008 is shaping up to be the year the major labels begin to adapt to environment.? The big question left is: how will artists break into the big time?

Bottom Line:? The Big Four are finally entering the digital revolution.

Mega online retailer Amazon is preparing to offer their MP3s in every language.? The company cites an overwhelming demand from customers for their DRM-free music downloads (which includes titale from all of the major labels).

Given the size and power Amazon carries on the internet, they are poised to set a new precedent for selling music digitally.? The largest online retailer of music by far is iTunes, and it will be interesting to see how Amazon’s shift to DRM-free music changes the playing field.

Bottom Line: Amazon offering their MP3 catalog worldwide will shift the landscape and methodology of digital music sales.